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Abstract
In this paper we study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilib-
ria (solution to competition-wise problems, with several controls trying
to reach possibly different goals) associated to linear partial differential
equations and show that, in some cases, they are also the solution of suit-
able single-objective optimization problems (i.e. cooperative-wise prob-
lems, where all the controls cooperate to reach a common goal). We use
cost functions associated with a particular linear parabolic partial differ-
ential equations and distributed controls, but the results are also valid for
more general linear differential equations (including elliptic and hyperbolic
cases) and controls (e.g. boundary controls, initial value controls,...).
Keywords: Nash equilibria, cooperative controls, noncooperative controls,
noncooperative game, linear partial differential equations, optimal control, ad-
joint system, multiobjective optimization, single-objective optimization.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibria are solutions of a noncooperative multiobjective optimization
strategy first proposed by Nash (see [1]). Since it originated in game theory and
economics, the notion of player is often used. For an optimization problem with
N objectives or functionals Ji to minimize, a Nash strategy consists in having N
players or controls vi, each optimizing his own criterion. However, each player
has to optimize his criterion given that all the other criteria are fixed by the
rest of the players. When no player can further improve his criterion, it means
that the system has reached a Nash equilibrium state.
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Of course, there are other strategies for multiobjective optimization, such as
the Pareto cooperative strategy ([2]), the Stackelberg hierarchical strategy ([3])
or the Stackelberg-Nash strategy ([4]).
To the best of our knowledge, [5] and [6] are the first articles dealing with
the theoretical and numerical study of Nash equilibria for differential games
associated to partial differential equations. Following [5] we deal here with a
general linear case with N cost functions and controllers and show how, in
some cases, the Nash equilibria (solution to differential games associated to
multiobjective optimization problems with several noncooperative controllers),
are also the solution of single-objective optimization problems (where all the
controllers cooperate to reach a common goal). We use cost functions associated
with linear parabolic partial differential equations and distributed controls, but
other kinds of linear differential equations (e.g. elliptic, hyperbolic,..) and
controls (e.g. boundary controls, initial value controls,...) can be also used,
using the same technique.
The fact that a noncooperative game (i.e a competition-wise problem) can be
seen as a (cooperative) single-objective optimization problem (i.e. a noncompetition-
wise problem) is very interesting, not only because of the curious noncooperative-
cooperative equivalence, but also because of the huge amount of software to
compute solutions and literature written about the latter kind of problems, that
could be used in the framework of, apparently, a different type of problems.
In Section 2 we formulate the problem and give an optimality system pro-
viding a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash equilibria. The exis-
tence and uniqueness of Nash equlibria is studied in Section 3. In Section 4 we
show the equivalence, in some cases, between the noncooperative multiobjective
differential games defining the Nash equlibria and suitable (cooperative) single-
objective optimization problems. Finally, in Section 5 give a summary of the
major results of the paper.
2 Formulation of the Problem
Let us consider T > 0, Ω ⊂ Rd a bounded and smooth open set with d ∈
{1, 2, 3}, and two subsets Γ1, Γ2 ⊂ ∂Ω such that ∂Ω = Γ1 ∪ Γ2. We define
Q = Ω × (0, T ), Σ1 = Γ1 × (0, T ), Σ2 = Γ2 × (0, T ) and the control Hilbert
spaces Ui = L2(ωi × (0, T )) and U = U1 × · · · × UN , where N ∈ N, ωi ⊂ Ω ,
for i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and ωi ∩ ωj = ∅ if i 6= j. Finally, we consider the functionals
Ji : U → R, with i ∈ {1, ..., N}, given by
Ji(v1, ..., vN ) =
αi
2
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt
+
1
2
∫
Q
ρi(x)|y − yi,d|
2dxdt+
1
2
∫
Ω
ηi(x)|y(T )− yi,T|
2dx,
2
for every v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U , where αi > 0, ρi, ηi ∈ L∞(Ω) such that ρi, ηi ≥ 0,
the function y = y(v) is defined as the solution of
∂y
∂t
−∆y = f +
N∑
i=1
viχωi in Q,
y(0) = y0 in Ω,
y = g1 on Σ1,
∂y
∂n
= g2 on Σ2,
(1)
with f, g1, g2, y0, yi,d and yi,T being smooth enough functions and χω : Ω → R
the characteristic function (with values 1 in ω and 0 in Ω \ ω) for any ω ⊂ Ω.
This generalizes the typical examples in the literature of 2 controls (instead
of N), ρi = kiχωd,i and ηi = liχωT,i, where ki, li > 0, ωd,i, ωT,i ⊂ Ω. A special
case is when ωT1 ∩ ωT,2 6= ∅ and/or ωd,1 ∩ ωd2 6= ∅. This case is a competition-
wise problem, with each control (or player) trying to reach (possibly) different
goals over a common domain. In some sense this is the case where the behavior
of the solution y associated to a Nash equilibrium is most difficult to forecast.
Remark 1 Most of the results to follow are also valid for more general linear
operators such as, for instance,
Aϕ =
∂ϕ
∂t
−∇ · (A(x)∇ϕ) + V · ∇ϕ+ c(x)ϕ.
The technique is also valid for different type of controls such as, for instance,
boundary or initial controls. 
Now, given i ∈ {1, ..., N}, for every (w1, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wN ) ∈ U1 × · · · ×
Ui−1 × Ui+1 × · · · × UN we consider the optimal control problem
(CPi)

Find ui(w1, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wN ) ∈ Ui, such that
Ji(w1, ..., wi−1, ui(w1, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wN ), wi+1, ..., wN )
≤ J1(w1, ..., wi−1, vi, wi+1, ...wN ), ∀vi ∈ Ui.
The (unique) solution ui(w1, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wN ) of problem (CP i) is char-
acterized by
∂Ji
∂vi
(w1, ..., wi−1, ui(w1, ..., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wN ), wi+1, ..., wN ) = 0.
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium is a N -tuple (u1, ..., uN ) ∈ U such that ui =
ui(u1, ...ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN ) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}, i.e. (u1, ..., uN) is a solution of
the coupled (optimality) system:
∂Ji
∂vi
(u1, ..., uN) = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (2)
In the linear case studied here, this system of equations is a necessary and
sufficient condition for u to be a Nash equilibrium. In general this system is
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only a necessary condition, although in some nonlinear cases (see, e.g. [7]), the
functionals are convex and system (2) is also a sufficient condition.
Following [5] it is easy to prove that, if i ∈ {1, ..., N},
∂Ji
∂vi
(v) = αivi + pi(v)χωi ∈ Ui,
where for any v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U the function pi = pi(v) is the solution of the
adjoint system 
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρi(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = ηi(y(T )− yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2
and y = y(v) is the solution of (1).
Therefore, system (2) is equivalent to the (optimality) system
ui = −
1
αi
piχωi , i ∈ {1, ..., N}

∂y
∂t
−∆y = f +
N∑
i=1
uiχωi in Q,
y(0) = y0 in Ω,
y = g1 on Σ1,
∂y
∂n
= g2 on Σ2;
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρi(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = ηi(y(T )− yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2.
, i ∈ {1, ..., N}
3 Existence and uniqueness of solution of Nash
Equlibria
It is obvious that
v = (v1, ..., vN ) −→ (
∂J1
∂v1
(v1, ..., vN ), ...,
∂JN
∂vN
(v1, ..., vN )) ∈ U (3)
is an affine mapping of U . Therefore, there exist a linear continuous mapping
A ∈ L(U ,U) and a vector b ∈ U such that
(
∂J1
∂v1
(v1, ..., vN ), ...,
∂JN
∂vN
(v1, ..., vN )) = Av − b.
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Let us identify mapping A: For every v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U , the linear part of
the affine mapping in relation (3) is defined by
Av = (α1v1 + p˜1χω1 , ..., αNvN + p˜NχωN ),
where p˜i = p˜i(v), i ∈ {1, ..., N}, is the solution of
−
∂p˜i
∂t
−∆p˜i = ρiy˜ in Q,
p˜i(x, T ) = ηiy˜(T ) in Ω,
p˜i = 0 on Σ1,
∂p˜i
∂n
= 0 on Σ2,
and y˜ = y˜(v) is the solution of
∂y˜
∂t
−∆y˜ =
N∑
i=1
viχωi in Q,
y˜(0) = 0 in Ω,
y˜ = 0 on Σ1,
∂y˜
∂n
= 0 on Σ2.
Proposition 1 Mapping A : U → U is linear and continuous. Furthermore, if
min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi} is sufficiently large, it is also U-elliptic, i.e., there existe C > 0
such that
(Av, v) ≥ C||v||2,
where (·, ·) and || · || represent the canonical scalar product and norm of the
Hilbert space U , respectively.
Proof: It is obvious that A is a linear mapping and it is easy to show that it is
continuous (see [8]).
Let us consider v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U and w = (w1, ..., wN ) ∈ U . We have
then
(Av, w) =
(
(α1v1 + p˜1χω1 , ..., αNvN + p˜NχωN ), (w1, ..., wN )
)
=
N∑
i=1
∫
ωi×(0,T )
(αivi + p˜i(v))widxdt.
Let us focus on the term
∫
ωi×(0,T )
p˜i(v)widxdt, following the approach in [5]
and [9]. We have ∫
ωi×(0,T )
p˜i(v)widxdt
=
∫
Q
p˜i(v)
(
∂
∂t
y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)−∆y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)
)
dxdt
5
=∫
Q
(
−
∂
∂t
p˜i(v) −∆p˜i(v)
)
y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dxdt
+
∫
Ω
ηiy˜(T ; v)y˜(T ; 0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dx
=
∫
Q
ρiy˜(v)y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dxdt+
∫
Ω
ηiy˜(T ; v)y˜(T ; 0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dx.
Then,
(Av, w) =
N∑
i=1
(
αi
∫
ωi×(0,T )
viwidxdt
+
∫
Q
ρiy˜(v)y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dxdt+
∫
Ω
ηiy˜(T ; v)y˜(T ; 0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dx
)
.
Since the mapping v → y˜(v) is linear and continuous from U to C([0, T ];L2(Ω))
(see, e.g., [8]), it is easy to prove there exist a constant c > 0 such that
||y˜(v)||L2(Q) + ||y˜(T ; v)||L2(Ω) ≤ c||v||. Therefore,
(A(v, v) ≥ min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi}||v||
2 −
N∑
i=1
c2(||ρi||L∞(Ω) + ||ηi||L∞(Ω))||v|| ||vi||Ui
≥ C||v||2,
with
C =
(
min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi} −
N∑
i=1
c2(||ρi||L∞(Ω) + ||ηi||L∞(Ω))
)
||v||2.
Notice that C > 0 if min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi} >
N∑
i=1
c2(||ρi||L∞(Ω) + ||ηi||L∞(Ω)), which
proves that A is U-elliptic in that case and completes the proof. 
Let us identify b: The constant part of the affine mapping (3) is the function
b ∈ U defined by b = (p1χω1 , ..., pNχωN ), where pi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, is the solution
of 
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρi(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = ηi(y − yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2,
and y is the solution of 
∂y
∂t
−∆y = f in Q,
y(0) = y0 in Ω,
y = g1 on Σ1,
∂y
∂n
= g2 on Σ2.
(4)
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Notice that, for any v ∈ U , y(v) = y˜(v) + y and pi(v) = p˜i(v) + pi.
Theorem 1 If min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi} is sufficiently large, there exist a unique Nash
equilibrium of the problem defined in Section 2.
Proof: As showed above, the Nash equilibria are characterized by the solutions
of (2), which are also characterized by the solutions u ∈ U of
a(u, v) = L(v), ∀ v ∈ U ,
where a a(·, ·) : U × U → R is defined by
a(v, w) = (Av, w) ∀ v, w ∈ U ,
and L : U → R by
L(v) = (b, v), ∀ v ∈ U .
Proposition 1 proves that mapping a(·, ·) is bilinear, continuous and, if min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi}
is sufficiently large, it is also U-elliptic. Furthermore, mapping L is (obviously)
linear and continuous. Thus, by the (well-known) Lax-Milgram Theorem, sys-
tem (2) has a unique solution or, equivalently, there exists a unique Nash equi-
librium of the problem defined in Section 2, if min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi} is sufficiently large.

The discretization of the problem considered above and the development of
suitable algorithms to get a numerical solution approximating the Nash equilibra
can follow the approaches in [5] and [9].
4 Equivalent single-objective control problems
In this section we will show that, in some cases, the solution of noncooper-
ative differential games defining Nash equilibria, are the solution of suitable
optimization problems, where all the controls cooperate to minimize a suitable
single-objective cost function.
Let us consider the subfamily of problems defined in Section 2, for which
ρi = ρ and ηi = η, for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Therefore, in this case the functional
Ji, with i ∈ {1, ..., N}, is given by
Ji(v1, ..., vN ) =
αi
2
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt
+
1
2
∫
Q
ρ|y − yi,d|
2dxdt+
1
2
∫
Ω
η|y(T )− yi,T|
2dx,
with y = y(v) being the solution of (1).
As in the general case studied in Section 2, a Nash equilibrium is a N -tuple
(u1, ..., uN) ∈ U = U1 × · · · × UN solution of (2), where
∂Ji
∂vi
(v) = αivi + pi(v)χωi ∈ Ui, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
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for any v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U and pi = pi(v) is now the solution of
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρ(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = η(y(x, T )− yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2.
Therefore, system (2) is equivalent in this case to
ui = −
1
αi
piχωi , i ∈ {1, ..., N}

∂y
∂t
−∆y = f +
N∑
i=1
uiχωi in Q,
y(0) = y0 in Ω,
y = g1 on Σ1,
∂y
∂n
= g2 on Σ2;
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρ(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = η(y(T )− yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2.
, i ∈ {1, ..., N}
Again
(
∂J1
∂v1
(v1, ..., vN ), ...,
∂JN
∂vN
(v1, ..., vN )) = Av − b.
and now
Av = (α1v1 + p˜χω1 , ..., αNvN + p˜χωN ),
where p˜ = p˜(v) is the solution of
−
∂p˜
∂t
−∆p˜ = ρy˜ in Q,
p˜(x, T ) = ηy˜(T ) in Ω,
p˜ = 0 on Σ1,
∂p˜
∂n
= 0 on Σ2,
Proposition 2 For the family of problems studied in Section 4 mapping A :
U → U is linear, continuous self-adjoint and U-elliptic.
Proof: Following the proof of Proposition 1, A is a linear and continous map-
ping. Furthermore, given v = (v1, ..., vN ) ∈ U and w = (w1, ..., wN ) ∈ U ,
(Av, w) =
N∑
i=1
(
αi
∫
ωi×(0,T )
viwidxdt
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+∫
Q
ρy˜(v)y˜(0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dxdt+
∫
Ω
ηy˜(T ; v)y˜(T ; 0, ..., wi, ..., 0)dx
)
=
N∑
i=1
αi
∫
ωi×(0,T )
viwidxdt +
∫
Ω
ρy˜(v)y˜(w)dxdt +
∫
Ω
ηy˜(T ; v)y˜(T ;w)dx
= (v,Aw)
and
(Av, v) ≥ min
i∈{1,...,N}
{αi}||v||
2,
which proves that A is self-adjoint and U-elliptic. 
The constant part of the affine mapping (3) is the function b ∈ U defined by
b = −(p1χω1 , ..., pNχωN ), where pi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, is now the solution of
−
∂pi
∂t
−∆pi = ρ(y − yi,d) in Q,
pi(T ) = η(y − yi,T) in Ω,
pi = 0 on Σ1,
∂pi
∂n
= 0 on Σ2,
and y is the solution of (4).
Theorem 2 There exist a unique Nash equilibrium of the problem defined in
Section 4.
Proof: The proof follows the one of Theorem 1, taking into account that in
this case A is unconditionally U-elliptic. 
The discretization of the problem considered above and the development of
suitable algorithms to get a numerical solution approximating the Nash equilibra
are given in [5], where numerical examples are also showed.
Theorem 3 The (unique) Nash equilibrium u = (u1, ..., uN ) ∈ U of the problem
defined in Section 4 is the (unique) solution of the following optimal control
problems:
9
• Find u ∈ U such that J(u) = min
v∈V
J(v), where
J(v) =
N∑
i=1
αi
2
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
(∫
Q
ρ|y(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)− yi,d|
2dxdt
+
∫
Ω
η|y(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)− yi,T|
2dx
)
+2
N∑
i,j=1(i<j)
(∫
Q
ρy(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)y(0, ..., vj, ..., 0)dxdt
∫
ωT
ηy(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)y(T ; 0, ..., vj, ..., 0)dx
)
.
• Given j, p ∈ {1, ..., N}, find u ∈ U such that Jj,p(u) = min
v∈U
Jj,p(v), where
Jj,p(v) =
N∑
i=1
αi
2
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt
+
1
2
∫
Q
ρ|y(v)− yj,d|
2dxdt+
1
2
∫
Ω
η|y(T ; v)− yp,T|
2dx
+2
N∑
i=1(i6=j)
∫
Q
ρ(yj,d − yi,d)y˜0, ..., vj, ..., 0)dxdt
+2
N∑
i=1(i6=p)
∫
Ω
η(yp,T − yi,T)y˜(T ; 0, ..., vj, ..., 0)dx.
Proof: We have seen previously that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium,
which is the solution u ∈ U of
(Au, v) = (b, v) ∀ v ∈ U .
Then, because of the properties of A given in Theorem 2, we have (see, e.g.,
[10, Theorem 2.44]) that
J˜(u) = min
v∈U
J˜(v),
with
J˜(v) = (Av, v) − 2(b, v) =
N∑
i=1
αi
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt+
∫
Q
ρ|y˜(v)|2dxdt
+
∫
Ω
η|y˜(T ; v)|2dx+ 2
N∑
i=1
∫
Q
ρ(y − yi,d)y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)dxdt
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+2
N∑
i=1
∫
Ω
η(y(T )− yi,T)y˜(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)dx.
Then, using that y˜(v) =
N∑
i=1
y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0), we have that
J˜(v) =
N∑
i=1
(
αi
∫
ωi×(0,T )
|vi|
2dxdt
+
∫
Q
ρ
[
|y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)|
2 + 2(y − yi,d)y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)
]
dxdt∫
Ω
η
[
|y˜(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)|
2 + 2(y(T )− yi,T)y˜(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)
]
dx
)
+2
N∑
i,j=1(i<j)
(∫
Q
ρy˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)y˜(0, ..., vj , ..., 0)dxdt
+
∫
Ω
ηy˜(T ; 0, ..., vi, ..., 0)y˜(T ; 0, ..., vj, ..., 0)dx
)
.
Hence, using that y = y˜ + y we have that
J˜(v) = J(v)− C,
where
C =
N∑
i=1
(
ρ
∫
Q
(y − yi,d)
2dxdt+
∫
Ω
η(y − yi,T)
2dx
)
is a constant (independent of v), which completes the proof of the first part of
the theorem.
In order to prove the second part of the theorem, given j ∈ {1, ..., N}, let us
focus on the following terms of J˜(v):∫
Q
ρ|y˜(v)|2dxdt+ 2
N∑
i=1
∫
Q
ρ(y − yi,d)y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)dxdt
=
∫
Q
ρ
[
|y˜(v)|2 + 2(y − yj,d)(y˜(v)− y˜(v1, ..., vj−1, 0, vj+1, ..., vN )
]
dxdt
+2
N∑
i=1(i6=j)
∫
Q
ρ(y − yi,d)y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)dxdt
=
∫
Q
ρ
[
|y˜(v)|2 + 2(y − yj,d)y˜(v)
]
dxdt
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+2
N∑
i=1(i6=j)
∫
Q
ρ(yj,d − yi,d)y˜(0, ..., vi, ..., 0)dxdt.
Something similar can be done with other terms of J˜(v), so that
J˜(v) = J(v)− Cj,p,
where
Cj,p =
∫
Q
ρ(y − yj,d)
2dxdt+
∫
Ω
η(y − yp,T)
2dx,
which completes the proof. 
5 Conclusions
This paper studies Nash equilibria of noncooperative differential games with
several players (controllers), each one trying to minimize his own cost function
defined in terms of a general class of linear partial differential equations. We give
results of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and show how, in some
cases, the corresponding Nash equilibria (solution to competition-wise problems,
with each control trying to reach possibly different goals), are also the solution of
suitable single-objective optimization problems (i.e. cooperative-wise problems,
where all the controls cooperate to reach a common goal). A natural question
arises: Are there Nash equilibria associated to nonlinear problems than can be
also characterized as the solutions of single-objective problems? This is an open
problem for interested researchers.
Acknowledgements: The research of the author was partially supported
by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project MTM2015-
64865-P (MINECO / FEDER), and the Research Group MOMAT (Ref. 910480)
of the Complutense University of Madrid.
References
[1] Nash, J. F.: Noncooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, 286295
(1951)
[2] Pareto, V.: Cours dE´conomie Politique, Rouge, Lausanne, Switzerland
(1896)
[3] Von Stackelberg, H.: Marktform und Gleichgewicht, Springer, Berlin, Ger-
many (1934)
[4] Dı´az, J. I., Lions, J. L.: On the approximate controllability of Stackel-
bergNash strategies. In: Daz, J.I. (ed.): Ocean Circulation and Pollution
Control - A Mathematical and Numerical Investigation, pp. 1727. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin (2004)
12
[5] Ramos, A. M., Glowinski, R., Periaux, J.: Nash Equilibria for the Multi-
Objective Control of Linear Partial Differential Equations. Journal of Opti-
mization, Theory and Applications, Vol. 112, N. 3, 457498 (2002). DOI link:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017981514093
[6] Ramos, A. M., Glowinski, R., Periaux, J.: Pointwise Control of the Burgers
Equation and related Nash Equilibrium Problems: A Computational Ap-
proach. Journal of Optimization, Theory and Applications, Vol. 112, N. 3,
499516 (2002). DOI link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017907930931
[7] Ramos, A. M., and Roubicek, T: Nash Equilibria in Nonco-
operative Predator-Prey Games. Applied Mathematics and Op-
timization. Volume 56, Number 2, 211241 (2007). DOI link:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00245-007-0894-5.
[8] Lions, J. L., Magenes, E.: Proble`mes aux Limites Non-Homoge`nes et Appli-
cations, Volumes I and II, Dunod, Paris, France (1968)
[9] Carvalho, P. P., Fernndez-Cara, E.: On the Computation of Nash and Pareto
Equilibria for Some Bi-objective Control Problems, J. Scientific Computing,
78:246273 (2019). DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10915-018-0764-0
[10] Ramos, A. M.: Introduccio´n al ana´lisis matema´tico del me´todo de elemen-
tos finitos, Editorial Complutense, Madrid (2012).
13
